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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal by the Defendant/Appellant from a final 
Order dated January 15, 1993, wherein the Third Judicial District 
Court, Honorable Judge Richard H. Moffat presiding, denied 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the Third Judicial District Court err in denying 
Defendant#s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment? 
2. Did the Third Judicial District Court abuse its 
discretion in denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The decision of a trial court to deny a motion should not be 
reversed unless it is shown that there was an abuse of 
discretion, [See, Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1988); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P. 2d 1318 (Utah 1987); Spica v. 
Garczynski, 78 F.R.D. 134 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (interpreting Rules 
55(c) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)]. The 
standard of appellate review in this matter is abuse of 
discretion of the trial court. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
No determinative authorities are contended, howeverf Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 55(c) and 60(b) are applicable 
and decisive as applied by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case and course of proceedings below. 
Plaintiff/Appellee (hereinafter referred to as "Potter") 
filed a complaint against Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter 
referred to as "C^l") on or about September 13# 1988. (R. 2-5). 
The Summons and Complaint were served upon C-21 on October 24, 
1988 by serving a company representative# Mr. Leonard Nielson, 
who is an attorney at law. (R. 10-12). Potter, after notice and 
hearing, obtained a default judgment against C-21 on December 15, 
1988, no appeal having been taken. (R. 19-22). Potter thereafter 
attempted to negotiate a settlement of the judgment with C-21. 
(R. 73). Approximately fifteen months later a motion was filed by 
C-21#s counsel entitled Motion To Set Aside Judgmentf (R. 23-25). 
Potter responded to C-21#s motion in a timely manner. (R. 56-77). 
With the exception of an answer being filed by C-21 two and one-
half (2 1/2) years too latef no other action was taken by any of 
C-21's attorneys until Potter filed a request for decision under 
Utah Code Ann., Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501. (R. 
89-90). The trial court then ruled upon C-21's motion and denied 
the same. (R. 91-95). C-21 filed the instant appeal. (R. 98). 
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B. Statement of facts. The facts explicit and implicit in 
Section A# Nature of the case and course of proceedings below# 
above, are the material facts upon which this appellate court can 
determine whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying C-21"s motion to set aside the default judgment- The 
facts as stated in C-21's "Statement of facts relevant to issues 
presented for review11 are not the facts to be considered by the 
appellate court as such facts are beyond the scope of review in 
this Court raising collateral issues by way of alleged defenses. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. C-21 had adequate opportunity to submit in a 
timely manner a motion to set aside default judgment and failed 
to do so; the trial court in reviewing all evidence before it on 
C-21's motion did not err in denying C-21's motion. 
POINT II. C-21 did not demonstrate to the trial court that 
any basis under the applicable Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
met, nor did C-21 show that it had a meritorious defense to the 
original promissory note action, and therefore* the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying C-21's motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I & POINT II 
C-21, in its "Brief of Appellant11
 # pages 6 through 12 
attempts to rehash alleged facts which are not relevant to the 
issues presented to this appellate court. They are the same facts 
as presented in the Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and the 
subsequent memoranda in support of such motion that C-21 
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presented to the trial court and which the trial court fully 
reviewed. 
The trial court made it clear in its minute entry the basis 
for the denial of C-21's motion and did not err nor abuse its 
discretion in doing so. The facts upon which the trial court 
based its decision are as follows: 
1. Previous counsel for Potter properly took judgment 
against C-21 when C-21 failed to Answer Potter's 
Complaint after proper service of Summons and Complaint. (R. 20-
22). 
2. Potter's previous counsel has no recollection of any 
conversation with C-21's counsel regarding an alleged 
stipulation that no further proceedings would occur. (R. 70-71). 
3. Potter's judgment was based upon a valid promissory 
note which was acknowledged by C-21 in a Report of 
Examination prepared by Certified Public Accountant# Scott L. 
Jensen, for C-21 on February 28, 1986, and noted that the 
note# payable on demand, would not be demanded until 12 months 
from that time (February 28, 1987). (R. 21-22). 
4. After the judgment was taken on December 15, 1988, 
Potter began discussions with C-21, and it's successors 
in interest, for payment of such judgment. (R. 73). 
5. Negotiations had been ongoing through about January of 
1990 for payment of the judgment. (R. 71-74). 
6. The allegations set forth in C-21's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Set Aside Judgment are over broad and have nothing 
to do with the promissory note and judgment thereupon. Such 
allegations are designed to cast a shadow upon Potter's character 
and raise issues that are beyond the scope of the issue of the 
promissory note. (R. 26-60). 
7. It is simply too late for C-21 to raise issues that 
are counterclaim issues to the judgment based upon a promissory 
note. The judgment was issued on December 15, 1988. C-21 had 
not filed the motion to set aside until February 26, 1990, nearly 
fifteen (15) months after the judgment, and, more significantlyf 
more than a year after Potter began negotiations on settlement 
of judgment with C-21 and it's successors in interest. (R. 73). 
8. C-21 had not raised a meritorious defense to the 
promissory note based judgment. (R. 91-95). 
9. If C-21 wishes to sue Potter on the extraneous 
issues which are raised in itfs motion, which are issues 
constituting an alleged counterclaim not based upon the 
promissory note, then C-21 could have done so. However, the 
judgment is valid and should not be set aside based upon such 
extraneous allegations. (R. 92). 
The trial court properly noted that in ordcsr for C-21 to be 
relieved from the default judgment, it must not only show that 
judgment was entered against it through excusable neglect, but 
must also show that its Motion to Set Aside was timely, and that 
it has a meritorious defense to the action- [See, State of Utah, 
et al. v. Musselman, et al., 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983); see also, 
3^ ar sen v. Collina, 684 P. 2d 52 (Utah 1984); Miller v. 
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Brocksmith. 825 p.2d 690 (Utah App. 1992); Lincoln Ben,Life v. D. 
T. Southern Prop,, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992); Home Sav. & 
Loan v, Aetna Cas. & Sur., 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991)]. 
In this case C-21 claims there was a stipulation between 
counsel that C-21 would not be required to answer the complaint. 
Potter's counsel has no recollection of such a stipulation. (See 
Affidavit of Richard J. Leedy, R. 70-70A). 
C-21's Motion was not timely. Nearly fifteen months expired 
from the time the judgment was rendered until the time the Motion 
was filed. During that period of time Potter negotiated with C-
21, and its successor in interest, for payment and/or settlement 
of the judgment, (see Affidavits of Lowell Potter and Thomas 
Potter, R. 71-77). C-21 clearly had actual knowledge of the 
judgment almost immediately after entry thereof. 
Furtherf in denying a motion to set aside the default 
judgment entered against a defendant for fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the 
trial court did not abuse it's discretion in denying defendant's 
motion and stated that each case must be looked at on its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances, and no general rule can be laid 
down respecting discretion to be exercised by the Judge. [See, 
Heath v. Mower# 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979)]. The lower Court 
reviewed the facts of this case extensively, and made its 
findings based upon those facts rendering a proper decision to 
leave the default judgment intact. [See, Workman v. Nagle 
Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990)]. 
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Notice of entry of the default judgment was not and is not a 
requirement of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in circumstances 
such as these. [See# Lincoln Ben. Life v. D. T. Southern Prop., 
838 P.2d 672f 675 (Utah App. 1992)]. In any event, C-21 had 
actual notice of the judgment and acted upon it by negotiating 
with Potter for settlement before filing its motion to set aside 
the default judgment. (R. 71-74). 
The default judgment in this case was based upon a 
promissory note. The amount was certain. The Court granting the 
default judgmentwas apprised of all pertinent facts and 
circumstances by counsel for Potter in a default hearing before 
the court. C-21 now raises collateral issues that cannot be the 
basis for a collateral attack upon the judgment. [See, Bowen v. 
Olson, 246 P.2d 602 (1952)]. Such collateral issues raised 
ostensibly as a defense are not sufficient to set aside a 
judgment by default. [See, Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)]. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court reviewed all the evidence before it, which 
is the same evidence before this appellate court:. The trial court 
did not err in denying C-21's motion; and, further, did not abuse 
its discretion in the denial of C-21's motion. 
For the reasons as set forth above, and as adequately 
supported by the record, C-21's appeal must fail and the trial 
court#s decision of January 13, 1993 and Order of January 15, 
1993 must be affirmed. 
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Dated this 2-°tT day of June, 1993. 
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